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Abstract
We consider an e-commerce sector with two retailers (which may be marketplaces)
and two delivery operators. Products are di¤erentiated according to the retailer and
the mode of delivery. The representation of product di¤erentiation is inspired by the
Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (2002) discrete choice model.
We examine vertical integration of a retailer/ delivery operator pair. Vertical re-
straints like bundling and/or foreclosure are then considered on top of the integration.
Vertical integration in itself eliminates double marginalization, which enhances con-
sumerswelfare. On the other hand, it reduces product variety, and the market power
it conveys is likely to reduce prots of the remaining rms. Bundling or foreclosure can
be expected to further exacerbate these negative e¤ects.
Our most remarkable result is that vertical integration of a single retailer/operator
pair will lead to bundling and foreclosure, and possibly the complete exit of the remain-
ing retailers and operators. This is true even when no explicit bundling or foreclosure
is put in place on an a priori basis. Consequently, a competition authority that is
concerned with total welfare, should not allow the initial merger.
Keywords: E-commerce, delivery operators, vertical integration, bundling, foreclosure
JEL Codes: L42, L81, L87.
1 Introduction
The signicant development of e-commerce and the emergence of market places has
been providing numerous benets to both retailers and customers. In addition, it has
been a boon for delivery operator and allowed postal services to compensate at least in
part revenue losses due to declining mail volumes. However, increasing concentration of
market power and the worry that it may be extended into adjacent markets has turned
into a major concern of policy makers and competition authorities. While there appears
to be a wide consensus that traditionalregulatory or competition policy may have to
be amended within the context of platforms, there are so far few rigorous studies that
can provide guidance. In this paper we take a step in this direction.
We consider an e-commerce sector with two retailers (which may be marketplaces)
and two delivery operators. Products are di¤erentiated according to the retailer and
the mode of delivery. Consequently there are four variants of the product. Integration
and/or delivery restrictions will reduce product variety; some of the four variants will
no longer be available. The representation of product di¤erentiation is inspired by the
Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (2002) discrete choice model.
We study several scenarios, starting with a reference case without integration or
delivery restrictions. Then, we examine how the equilibrium is a¤ected by the vertical
integration of a retailer/ delivery operator pair. Next, vertical restraints like bundling
and/or foreclosure are considered on top of the integration.1 Vertical integration in itself
eliminates double marginalization for the concerned products. This enhances consumers
welfare. On the other hand, it reduces product variety, and the market power it conveys
is likely to reduce prots of the remaining rms. Bundling or foreclosure can be expected
to further exacerbate these negative e¤ects.
Prots, prices and consumer welfare in these scenarios demonstrate the (anti)competitive
e¤ects of integration and strategies like bundling and foreclosure. This, in turn, leads
to policy recommendations for competition authorities.
1 In the economic literature, foreclosure is dened as the dominant rms denial of proper access to
an essential good it produces, with the intent of extending monopoly from that segment to an adjacent
segment; Rey and Tirole (2007).
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The most remarkable result we obtain is that vertical integration of a single re-
tailer/operator pair will lead to bundling and foreclosure and possibly the complete exit
of the remaining retailers and operators. This is true even when no explicit bundling or
foreclosure is put in place on an a priori basis. The restraints emerge spontaneously as
prot maximizing strategies in a Nash equilibrium.
These results lead to the following policy recommendations. When the regulating
authority is concerned with total welfare, the initial merger should not be allowed. If,
however, a vertical integration has already taken place, competition authorities should
also give their clearance to the merger between the two remaining independent entities.
This is better for consumers as well as the collectivity as a whole.
2 The model
We consider an e-commerce sector with two retailers, which may be marketplaces, and
two delivery operators. Products are di¤erentiated according to the retailer and the
mode of delivery. Consequently there are four variants of the product. Integration
and/or delivery restrictions will reduce product variety; some of the four variants will
no longer be available.
Product di¤erentiation is represented by the Anderson-De Palma-Thisse (1992) dis-
crete choice model. This approach is widely used in the Industrial Organization litera-
ture to model product di¤erentiation2. However, it has not been used to study vertical
relationships (integration, bundling or foreclosure).
A di¤erentiated product is sold by downstream sellers A and B (indexed by j) with
marginal cost normalized to 0 and shipped via di¤erentiated upstream postal operators
1 and 2 (indexed by i) with marginal costs of c. Consequently there are potentially four
di¤erent variants of the product.
There is a mass 1 of consumers. Consumer l derives utility
U lij = b  pij + "lij
2 I.e. the process of distinguishing a product or service from others to benet from consumers het-
erogeneity of taste.
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from consuming good ij where j = A;B and i = 1; 2. The random variables "lij are
identically and independently distributed across consumers and products with double
exponential distribution over R with scale parameter .3
The parameter  reects the degree of product di¤erentiation. When  is small, the
di¤erent variants are close substitutes and competition is intense.4 When  is large,
each variant has roughly speaking a local monopoly and competition is not very intense.
Consumers buy their preferred variant of the product if any. Consequently consumer
l buys product ij when
U lij  max
mn6=ij
fUmng
It can be shown that the demand for good ij is then given by
Dij (p) =
exp
  pij P
i=1;2
P
j=A;B exp
  pij  (1)
where p =(p1A; p1B; p2A; p2B) is the vector of consumer prices. Note that the second
term in the denominator is absent when there is no outside option. The impact of prices
on demand levels are expressed by
@Dij (p)
@pij
=
  1 exp
  pij  Pi=1;2Pj=A;B exp   pij + 1 exp  pij  exp   pij P
i=1;2
P
j=A;B exp
  pij 2
=
1

  Dij +D2ij
=
1

Dij (Dij   1) < 0;
so that a variants market share is not surprisingly a decreasing function of its price.
Further we have
@Dij (p)
@pmn
=
1
 exp
  pij  exp   pmn P
i=1;2
P
j=A;B exp
  pij 2
=
1

DijDmn > 0;
3The distribution function of the double exponential distribution is F (x) = exp
   exp    x


.
4When the distribution of x is given by F (x) = exp
   exp    x


, a smaller  means that there is
a larger probability of x exceeding a given threshold. This can be interpreted as the products supplied
being closer substitutes.
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so that demand for any good increases if the price of one of the other variants increases.
This shows that the variants are indeed substitutes and also illustrates the role of the
parameter . In particular the cross price e¤ect is the larger the smaller is .
Expected consumer surplus is given by
CS =  ln
0@X
i=1;2
X
j=A;B
exp

b  pij

1A ;
see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1979), p.114.
In the simplest version of this model the market is fully covered. Each consumer
buys one of the variants. This is convenient and often used in industrial economics
models, but it has the disadvantage that absolute price levels do not matter. Relative
prices are important because they a¤ect the allocation of consumers across variants but
multiplying all prices by a positive constant has no impact on the outcome (at least as
far as total surplus and demand levels are concerned). To introduce adjustments at the
extensive margin, we can introduce an outside option as a fth variant with a given price
p0.5 Then the levels of prices also matter and welfare measures are more meaningful.
The numerical results for both cases are reported separately, the ones without outside
option are in appendix.
Note that the outside option can be interpreted as a competitive fringe which sells a
homogenous product at marginal cost. From that perspective, we extend the dominant
rm model (à la Panzar) from a monopoly to a duopoly (where both upstream and
downstream rms behave strategically).
We consider di¤erent scenarios with or without integration and/or exclusion or
bundling. We state the problem and dene the underlying game and specically its
timing. We start with the unrestricted case where retailers and operators are indepen-
dent and there are no vertical restraints. Then we dene the di¤erent scenarios.
For the sake of interpretation, note that within this model, integration and vertical
5 In that case expression (1) becomes
Dij (p) =
exp
   pij

P
i=1;2
P
j=A;B exp
   pij


+ exp
   p0


and the subsequent expressions have to be amended in a straighforward way.
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restraints a¤ect prices but also product variety. Restraints will reduce the number
of variants available to consumers which tends to decrease welfare unless of course
compensated by a su¢ cient decrease in prices.
In the symmetric case, the model can be solved analytically but the expressions
are not very telling; see Anderson et al. (1992). In the asymmetric cases, obtaining
analytical closed form solutions would be at best very tedious. However, the model has
essentially only one or two parameters depending on whether we consider an outside
option or not. When there is no outside option, the only relevant parameter is . The
cost c plays no role and can be normalized to any (strictly positive) level. When there is
an outside option, the parameters are  and p0. To be more precise, the crucial second
parameter is not the absolute level of p0 but the ratio p0=c.
Consequently numerical solutions are just as informative as analytical expressions
and with one or two parameters only, their robustness is easy to verify. Comparing the
scenarios tells out how integration, foreclosure or bundling a¤ect prots and thus entry
as well as consumer surplus and overall welfare.
3 The game without integration or restrictions
We start with a reference scenario with no integration or delivery restrictions, which is
represented in Figure 1. Upstream, the delivery operators compete and set their linear
delivery rates for each retailer. Retailers compete for the nal customers for whom
variants of the product are di¤erentiated according to the retailer and the delivery
operator. Each retailer can use both delivery operators.
The timing of the game is as follows. In a rst stage delivery operators i = 1; 2
simultaneously set rates prices tiA and tiB for retailers A and B respectively. Their
prot is given by
i =
X
j
(tij   c)Dij (:) , i = 1; 2:
In stage 2, retailers j = A;B simultaneously set their prices p1j and p2j by taking as
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given the delivery rates. Their prot is given by
j =
X
i
(pij   tij)Dij (:) , j = 1; 2:
Note that a game with the opposite sequence would not be well dened and doesnt
make sense. We determine the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game which, as usual,
is solved by backward induction. We briey explain the main steps for this scenario.
To avoid repetitions we skip this part for the subsequent scenarios.
3.1 Stage 2
The problem of retailer j is given by
max
p1j ;p2j
j =
X
i
(pij   tij)Dij (p) ;
with rst order conditions
D1j + (p1j   t1j) @D1j
p1j
= 0;
D2j + (p2j   t2j) @D2j
p2j
= 0;
which yields
1  (p1j   t1j) 1

(1 D1j (p)) = 0; (2)
1  (p2j   t2j) 1

(1 D2j (p)) = 0: (3)
for j = A;B.
This denes the second stage equilibrium prices p (t)= (p1A (t) ; p1B (t) ; p2A (t) ; p2B (t))
as functions of t =(t1A; t1B; t2A; t2B), the vector of delivery rates.
3.2 Stage 1
In this stage, operators anticipate the equilibrium induced in stage 2. Problem of
operator i = 1; 2 is
max
tiA;tiB
i =
X
j
(tij   c)Dij (p (t)) , i = 1; 2
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with rst order condition
DiA + (tiA   c)
X
l=1;2
X
j=A;B
@DiA
@plj
@plj
@tiA
+ (tiB   c)
X
l=1;2
X
j=A;B
@DiB
@plj
@plj
@tiA
= 0;
DiB + (tiB   c)
X
l=1;2
X
j=A;B
@DiB
@plj
@plj
@tiB
+ (tiA   c)
X
l=1;2
X
j=A;B
@DiA
@plj
@plj
@tiB
= 0:
Solving this system of equations for i = 1; 2 yields the vector of equilibrium delivery
rates which in turn determine the equilibrium retail prices p(t) in the rst stage.
4 The game with integration without delivery restrictions
Assume now that retailer A and operator 1 are integrated. The integrated rm sells and
delivers good A, the marginal cost of which is c. The integrated rm can also deliver
good B in quantity D1B at a rate t1B and may have good A delivered by rm 2 at rate
t2A and in quantity D2A. This scenario is represented in Figure 2.
The timing of the game is as follow. In stage 1, the integrated rm chooses t1B such
that it maximizes
I1 = (p1A   c)D1A (p) + (p2A   t2A)D2A (p) + (t1B   c)D1B (p)
and delivery operator 2 chooses t2A and t2B to maximize
2 =
X
j
(t2j   c)D2j (p) :
In stage 2, retailers once again simultaneously choose their prices. For rm B, the
problem is exactly the same as in the previous scenario; it sets prices p1B and p2B to
maximizes
B =
X
i=1;2
(piB   tiB)DiB (p) :
The problem of the integrated rm, on the other hand is di¤erent as it maximizes total
prots from its upstream and downstream activities. Formally, it chooses p1A and p2A
to maximize.
I1 = (p1A   c)D1A (p) + (p2A   t2A)D2A (p) + (t1B   c)D1B (p) :
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5 The game with integration and bundling
Compared to the previous scenario, we add the extra constraint that there is bundling in
the sense that the product sold by rm A must be delivered by the integrated operator
1. Variant 2A of the product thus no longer exists. Let pFA = (pA; p1B; p2B) the prices
of the remaining variants. The demand functions for these variants follow directly from
equation (1).6 This scenario is represented in Figure 3.
The timing of the game is as follow. In Stage 1, the integrated rm chooses t1B to
maximize
I1 = (pA   c)DA
 
pFA

+ (t1B   c)D1B
 
pFA

;
while delivery operator 2 chooses t2B to maximize
2 = (t2B   c)D2B
 
pFA

:
In Stage 2, the integrated rm sets pA in order to maximize
I1 = (pA   c)DA
 
pFA

+ (t1B   c)D1B
 
pFA

;
while retailer B sets its prices p1B and p2B to maximize
B =
X
i=1;2
(piB   tiB)DiB (p)
6 The game with integration and foreclosure
Assume now that the delivery operator which is part of the integrated rm does not
deliver good B. This yields the scenario depicted in Figure 4. Again, one variety
disappears namely 1B and we dene pFB = (pA1; pA2; pB) as the vector of prices of the
6We have for i = 1; 2:
DA

pFA

=
exp
   pA


exp
   pA


+
P
i=1;2 exp
   piB

 ;
DiB

pFA

=
exp
   piB


exp
   pA


+
P
i=1;2 exp
   piB

 :
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remaining variants. The derivation of the demand functions DiA
 
pFA

and DB
 
pFA

is straightforward.7
The timing of the game is as follow. In the rst stage, delivery operator 2 is the sole
7We have
DiA

pFA

=
exp
   piA


exp
   pB


+
P
i=1;2 exp
   piA


DB

pFA

=
exp
   pB


exp
   pB


+
P
i=1;2 exp
   piA


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active player and chooses t2A and t2 to maximize
2 = (t2A   c)D2A
 
pFB

+ (t2B   c)DB
 
pFB

:
In Stage 2, retailer B chooses its price pB like in the previous scenarios, that is to
maximize
B = (pB   t2B)DB
 
pFB

:
The integrated rm simultaneously sets p1A and p2A and to maximize the sum of up-
stream and downstream prots given by
I1 = (p1A   c)D1A
 
pFB

+ (p2A   t2A)D2A
 
pFB

:
7 The game with integration and total bundling/foreclosure
Assume now that the integrated retailer delivers good A only via its own operator and
that the integrated delivery operator does not deliver good B; see Figure 5. We are now
left with two variants with prices pF = (pA; pB).8
The timing follows the same logic as in the previous scenarios. In the rst stage,
delivery operator 2 is the only active player and chooses t2 to maximize
2 = (t2   c)DA
 
pF

:
In stage 2, the integrated rm chooses pA to maximize
I1 = (pA   c)DA
 
pF

;
while the problem of retailer B continues to be the same as in the previous scenarios:
it simultaneously chooses its price pB to maximize
B = (pB   t2)DB
 
pF

:
8Demand functions are given by
DA(p
F ) =
exp
   pA


exp
   pA


+ exp
   pB

 ;
DB(p
F ) =
exp
   pB


exp
   pA


+ exp
   pB

 :
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8 Double integration
Finally, we consider the case where both retailer-operator pairs integrate: retailer A
with operator 1 and retailer B with operator 2. This scenario is not directly relevant
for studying the issues of bundling and foreclosure. However, it is interesting to draw a
complete picture of the implications of vertical integration. Furthermore this scenario
is useful for comparing the results obtained in this setting with product di¤erentiation
to those obtained in a homogenous product model by Borsenberger et al. (2018).
We skip the formal denition of this game which follows in a straightforward way
from the previous scenarios. Like in Section 7 there are only two variants left and
demand functions are as specied in footnote 8. Roughly speaking the game now reduces
to a single stage, where the integrated rms choose p1A and p2B to maximize their
respective prots and we calculate the Nash equilibrium of this game.
9 Numerical results
The equilibria in the various scenarios are reported in Tables 14. The tables for the
most are self-explanatory. The rst column is the equilibrium without integration.
The second represents integration without restrictions. The third is integration plus
bundling, the fourth integration plus foreclosure, the fth integration with foreclosure
and bundling all as dened above. The last column is the double integration scenario.
For each scenario we report all the relevant equilibrium prices, delivery rates, prots
of retailers and delivery operators, demand levels as well as consumer (CS) and total
surplus (TS). The symbol   in a cell means that the corresponding variable is not
relevant. The symbol  (for prices or delivery rates) means that there is a corner
solution: demand drops to zero (the price is then not uniquely determined all levels
su¢ ciently large to yield zero demand are equivalent). In all simulations c is set to 1;
this is essentially just a normalization.
The simulations have shown that results are robust and that two main cases have
to be considered: low  variants are relatively close substitutes on the one hand and
large  variants are not as easily substitutable on the other hand. While the overall
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No Int. Int. w/ restriction Int. bundling Int. foreclosure Int. for. & b. Double Int.
p1A 2:92 2:60 2:86 2:60 2:60 1:94
p2A 2:92        
p1B 2:92  2:63     
p2B 2:92  2:94    1:94
t1A 2:08          
t2A 2:08        
t1B 2:08  1:61      
t2B 2:08  1:98    
1 0:44 1:10 0:67 1:10 1:10 0:44
2 0:44 0 0:19 0 0 0:44
A 0:34          
B 0:34 0 0:58 0 0  
D1A 0:20 0:68 0:23 0:68 0:68 0:47
D2A 0:20 0   0    
D1B 0:20 0 0:37      
D2B 0:20 0 0:20 0 0 0:47
CS 7:86 7:58 7:85 7:58 7:58 8:43
TS 9:44 8:68 9:30 8:68 8:68 9:32
Table 1: Outside option such that p0 = 3c; low  = 0:5.
picture is the same, some specic results di¤er according to whether an outside option
is available or not. We concentrate on the cases where an outside option is available
because welfare measures are more meaningful in this case. Table 1 presents the results
with a low  ( = 0:5) while Table 2 considers a larger level of  ( = 1). The
counterparts to these results for the case without outside option are presented in the
appendix. Within each of the two cases that emerge, di¤erent levels of  and p0 appear
to yield the same pattern of results.
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No Int. Int. w/ restriction Int. bundling Int. foreclosure Int. for. & b. Double Int.
p1A 8:31 5:65 8:06 5:98 5:65 4:68
p2A 8:31    8:44    
p1B 8:31  7:12 7:36    
p2B 8:31 7:27 8:38   7:27 4:68
t1A 5:05          
t2A 5:05    3:45    
t1B 5:05  3:23      
t2B 5:05 4:59 4:68 4:76 4:59  
1 1:56 2:65 2:37 2:98 2:65 1:68
2 1:56 0:91 0:69 1:20 0:91 1:68
A 1:26          
B 1:26 0:67 2:09 0:60 0:67  
D1A 0:19 0:57 0:22 0:46 0:57 0:45
D2A 0:19 0   0:13   0:45
D1B 0:19 0 0:35      
D2B 0:19 0:25 0:18 0:23 0:25  
CS 4:97 5:47 4:93 5:55 5:47 6:88
TS 10:63 9:71 10:09 10:34 9:71 10:24
Table 2: Outside option with p0 = 8c; large  = 1:
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The rst remarkable property is that when retailer A integrates, foreclosure and
bundling appear spontaneously(in equilibrium) even when they are not imposed ex
ante. In other words, even when the retailer does not commit to such a policy (say
in stage 0), as in the following scenarios, the relevant markets disappear in the Nash
equilibrium. Consequently columns 2 and 5 are essentially identical. In particular, the
consumer surplus is identical: such spontaneous vertical restraints are not detrimental
to consumers. They cannot be considered and condemned as anticompetitive prac-
tices when in a rst step, merger between upstream and downstream entities has been
authorized.
Intuitively, the integrated rm increases the delivery rate applied to the other retailer
because this increases the competitors cost. This increase is so signicant that the
other retailer no longer uses this delivery option so that we e¤ectively have foreclosure
in equilibrium. Note that since variety 1B is no longer available the integrated operator
foregoes some revenues but it also reduces competition in the downstream market and
this e¤ect dominates. As to the bundling, the integrated rm prefers using its own
delivery operator which is cheaper. Once again it foregoes a variety in the process
(namely 2A) but the cost e¤ect dominates.
When  is small so that the products are relatively close substitutes, these forces are
so signicant that when A and 1 integrate, the remaining retailer and delivery operator
exit the market in equilibrium (their demands drop to zero). As the last column shows,
they can, however, avoid this outcome by forming their own vertical chain (which would
realize a positive prot of 0:44).
When  is su¢ ciently large, on the other hand, retailer B will be able to preserve a
positive market share (and prot) in equilibrium and use operator 2s delivery services.
Intuitively, products are then su¢ ciently di¤erentiated to that retailer A cannot capture
the entire market. Still integration leads to an equilibrium with both foreclosure and
bundling (D1B and D2A drop to zero). Furthermore, like for smaller levels of  it
remains true that B and 2 would be better o¤ by forming their own vertical chain.
So far we have considered the cases where the integrated rm does not a priori
commit to any vertical restraint. When it commits to both policies, we get exactly the
18
same outcome. With a low  this is also true when it only commits to foreclosure.
Interestingly, however, when it commits to bundling only, there will be no foreclosure
in equilibrium and the independent actors remain in the market, irrespective of the
level of . To understand these results, consider rst the case where the integrated rm
commits to foreclosure. In other words, it foregoes some delivery activity, namely that of
the good sold by retailer B. In this case, it is in its interest to bundle its own product with
delivery by its parcel delivery business unit in order to maximize its delivery activity.
This is achieved because under bundling consumers of good A no longer have the option
of receiving delivery by operator 2. Next consider the case where the integrated rms
commits to bundle its good and delivery service. In this case, it is not in its interest
to practice foreclosure. Quite the opposite; it maximizes the activity of its retailing
division by allowing consumers to be delivered by the independent delivery operator.
This is reminiscent of a result obtained by Reisinger and Tarantino (2015) who show that
when an upstream monopolist integrates with an (ine¢ cient) retailer, the monopolist
would prefer maintaining the distribution of its goods through the other retailer. We
do not consider di¤erences in retailerse¢ ciency but like in their setting we have an
output-shifting e¤ect as the e¢ cient retailer helps him expanding the output on the
nal market.
Furthermore, when the integration is associated with commitment to bundling only
the remaining rms no longer gain by forming a second vertical chain.
Turning to welfare, our results show that integration of any kind, with or without
extra restraints, decreases welfare. Consumer surplus, on the other hand, is highest in
the double integration scenario. This is because the absence of double marginalization
leads to a drastic decrease in prices which more than outweighs the reduction of product
di¤erentiation. However, the increase in consumer surplus is not su¢ ciently signicant
to compensate the decrease in producer surplus.
To sum up, vertical integration of a single retailer/operator pair will lead to bundling
and foreclosure and possibly the complete exit of the remaining retailers and operators.
This is true even when no explicit bundling or foreclosure is put in place on an a priori
basis. The restraints emerge spontaneously as prot maximizing strategies in a Nash
19
equilibrium.
10 Concluding comments
From a competition policy perspective this is an example of a situation where market
power in one market segment may spill over to others. This is in line with the results
of Rey and Tirole (2007) who show that the anti-competitive e¤ects of exclusionary
practices are more important if the market power is in the downstream market. This is
because the exclusive practices enhance its monopoly power as it extracts all the prots
from the upstream rms and charges monopoly price to nal consumers. The treatment
of these restraints, initially based on the block exemption Regulation of 1999, is now
essentially relying on Regulation 330/2010 and some more recent guidelines. The main
evolution, following the growth of massive retailers in Europe and the rise of internet
distribution, has been to move toward a more e¤ect-basedapproach. This means that
the crucial issue is to determine whether a vertical agreement (or part of it), has actual
or potential anti-competitive e¤ects that are not outweighed by pro-competitive e¤ects
(or objective justications); see Petit and Henry (2010).
When the negative e¤ects of the exclusionary practice outweigh the positive e¤ects,
some remedies are recommended to restore an outcome that enhances social welfare.
The remedies can be either structural ones like the divestiture of the property rights or
the prohibition of the vertical merger. There could be behavioral remedies that would
consist in imposing unbundling or non discriminatory practices.
In the case we studied, the following policy recommendations could be made: based
on the maximization of total welfare criteria, the initial merger should not be allowed. If,
however, a vertical integration has already taken place, competition authorities should
also give their clearance to the merger between the two remaining independent entities.
This is better for consumers as well as the collectivity as a whole.
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No Int. Int. w restriction Int. bundling Int. foreclosure Int. for. & b. Double Int
p1A 3:5 2:48 3:19 2:59 2:48 2
p2A 3:5    3:16    
p1B 3:5  2:91 2:84    
p2B 3:5 2:82 3:44   2:82 2
t1A 2:5          
t2A 2:5    1:57    
t1B 2:5  1:67      
t2B 2:5 2:06 2:38 2:11 2:06  
1 0:75 0:98 1:00 1:09 0:98 0:5
2 0:75 0:35 0:25 0:44 0:35 0:5
A 0:5          
B 0:5 0:25 0:84 0:22 0:25  
D1A 0:25 0:66 0:30 0:52 0:66 0:5
D2A 0:25 0   0:16    
D1B 0:25 0 0:52 0:32    
D2B 0:25 0:34 0:18   0:34 0:5
CS 7:19 7:72 7:40 7:73 7:72 8:34
TS 9:69 9:31 9:50 9:50 9:31 9:34
Table 3: No outside option; low sigma  = 0:5:
Appendix
A.1 Results without outside option
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No Int. Int. w/ restriction Int. bundling Int. foreclosure Int. for. & b. Double int.
p1A 11 6:93 9:79 7:36 6:93 5
p2A 11    9:67    
p1B 11  8:66 8:37    
p2B 11 8:28 10:78   8:28 5
t1A 7          
t2A 7    3:31    
t1B 7  3:68      
t2B 7 5:26 6:53 5:45 5:26  
1 3 3:93 4:01 4:36 3:93 2
2 3 1:43 1:00 1:78 1:43 2
A 2          
B 2 1:01 3:37 0:91 1:01  
D1A 0:25 0:66 0:30 0:52 0:66 0:5
D2A 0:25 0   0:16    
D1B 0:25 0 0:52 0:32    
D2B 0:25 0:34 0:18   0:34 0:5
CS 1:77 3:89 2:63 3:94 3:89 6:38
TS 11:77 10:27 11:01 11:00 10:27 10:38
Table 4: No outside option; large  = 1:
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